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Leading decision makers, academics and experts including Frank 
Brenner, Director of Eurocontrol, and Matthew Baldwin, Director for 
Air Aviation and International Transport Policy in DG MOVE, gathered 
at the 5th Florence Air Forum to discuss “the market approach” in Air 
traffic Control (ATC) and the evolving role of Eurocontrol. Both issues 
are closely related: Eurocontrol supports the introduction of market 
elements for certain ATC support services in order to increase efficiency 
in the Single European Sky without conflicting with its Member States’ 
interest to maintain a national Air Traffic Control system. This in 
turn will contribute to further evolving the role of Eurocontrol and re-
shaping the current structure of ATC in Europe.
One part of the discussion focussed on where and how market 
elements can play a role in air traffic management whereas the other 
part looked at what governance structure would be appropriate and 
which actors could take over which functions in the future. 
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From SES gridlock to ATC markets to 
evolving the role of Eurocontrol
A comment by MATTHIAS FINGER | FSR-Transport Director
The 5th Florence Air Forum marked, at least conceptually, a significant step 
forward. Building on the previous Forum and on a general agreement that the 
current gridlock of the Single European Sky (SES) is unsustainable, the Forum 
addressed the question of competition in Air Traffic Control (ATC) services 
and what such competition would ultimately mean for the evolving role of 
Eurocontrol.
There indeed seems to emerge a certain acceptance, especially among smaller 
Air Navigation Services Providers (ANSP) confronted with problems of 
economies of scale and corresponding costs for investments, that some of 
the ATC services (such as Meteorological Services, Flight Service Stations, 
Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast, ATC training, as well as Data 
Communications Services) could be unbundled and outsourced to specialized 
providers, thus leading to reduced costs and overall efficiency gains. Some of 
these services could be provided by ANSPs specializing in them, as well as 
by privates entering this ATC market. Everyone agrees that this is a gradual 
process whereby services outsourcing and services provision will phase in 
parallel to internal transformations of the ANSPs, basically reflecting national 
dynamics and emerging market opportunities.
The next logical question then pertains what needs to be coordinated at the 
European level so as to make such ATC services markets work, considering 
that we are dealing with imperfect infrastructure markets that will need 
supranational coordination and corresponding regulation. The question also 
is whether there are some basic infrastructure services that can actually not 
be opened to competition, such as radars, flight data processors, ground 
infrastructures bound to the airports and others more. 
This is where Eurocontrol comes in: to recall, Eurocontrol predates the SES 
initiative. Yet, in the context of the creation of the SES, it has been tasked by 
the European Commission to become the network manager, thus providing 
some sort of infrastructure function for European ATC. Clearly, Eurocontrol is 
therefore not a regulator. Rather, the regulatory function is located somewhere 
in the European Commission, or in a body it may designate as being/becoming 
the regulator, such as the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA). Already 
today, EASA is the safety regulator of Eurocontrol.
But what does managing the network mean? Is this primarily a coordinating 
function (e.g., the coordination of the different network managing activities of 
the different ANSPs) or is it (evolving into) an operational function, whereby 
Eurocontrol gradually takes over network managing functions from the 
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respective ANSPs? And which of these network managing functions are actually 
monopolistic in the sense that they constitute a necessary infrastructure for 
other services that can then be provided commercially and competitively?
If Eurocontrol is to become the infrastructure provider of the monopolistic 
network managing functions, one specific question arises: first, can it then also 
be an ATC services provider? The problem here is that it would provide ATC 
services in competition with other ATC services providers, yet it would be 
at the same time the infrastructure monopolist, something which is known 
from other sectors to lead to potential market distortion. At the least, this 
would lead to the need for an economic regulator, which would have to make 
sure that Eurocontrol does not discriminate against its competitors. But even 
if Eurocontrol was precluded from also providing competitive ATC services, 
there would still be a need for regulating its monopolistic activities from an 
economic point of view (efficiency).
Historically, Eurocontrol is an intergovernmental organization, whose role 
it is to coordinate between the different national ANSPs and their respective 
owners (i.e., the governments) in terms of interconnection of airspace and 
(common) standards of interoperability. These coordinating functions can 
be and, to a certain extent, are already partially replaced by the European 
Commission. This is at least the case for the 28 EU Member States and could 
evolve as well through the bilateral agreements with the other non-EU States 
that are members of Eurocontrol though. Yet, on the other hand, the European 
Commission could also explicitly outsource these coordinating functions to 
Eurocontrol (on a contractual basis).
The above considerations can be boiled down to the question as to what the 
network managing function really is: is it a genuine infrastructure services 
provision (notably the management of scarce airspace in terms of flows and 
safety), on the basis of which all other ATC services can exist?  Or is it just a 
transitory function of coordinating the national ANSPs, which will disappear 
once all (national) ATC services are unbundled and competitively offered? 
In the first case, Eurocontrol will most likely, and over time, evolve into the 
European (and beyond) monopolistic ATC infrastructure services provider, 
to be regulated by a European agency, most likely EASA. In the second case, 
Eurocontrol is just another inter-governmental organization that will gradually 
become obsolete as unbundling and outsourcing of ATC services progresses.
Whether it will be one or the other - i.e., the answer to the future of Eurocontrol 
- probably lies in technology, as technological developments ultimately will 
decide whether (or not) and for how long monopolistic ATC infrastructures 
services will be necessary for operational and safety purposes.
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The Forum was focused on markets in Air Traffic 
Control (ATC) and on the future role of Eurocontrol. 
After an opening speech laying out the vision of 
Eurocontrol and the possible role of markets in 
ATC support services in Europe, the discussion 
touched on several elements (see also comments of 
Prof. Finger). This summary is structured around 
the three discussion questions of the Forum.
ATC infrastructure – What roles for 
markets and competition in infrastructure 
deployment and services?
The discussion involved different opinions on how 
market elements can contribute to making the 
European Air Traffic Management (ATM) system 
more efficient in spite of political problems to 
complete consolidation. In particular, the discussion 
focused on: the current European situation, the 
lessons that Europe could learn from the US 
context, and the situation of competition in ATM at 
the global level with specific attention dedicated to 
the role of the industry.
The fragmentation of European ATM is one of 
the biggest obstacles to increasing its efficiency. 
According to the International Air Transport 
Association (IATA), the number of control centres in 
Europe would have to be reduced significantly. This 
is however infeasible in the near future because of 
the political and social cost that would be incurred, 
especially on smaller states that would in some 
instances be forced to give up their national ATM 
system. Acknowledging the political constraints 
that are difficult to overcome, Eurocontrol is asking, 
“what is the core business of ATM that cannot be 
consolidated” and, how the issue of fragmentation 
can be tackled in a more indirect way. This is what 
the Centralized Services (CS) aim at. By opening 
up tendering for some of the CS, Eurocontrol has 
started moving towards competition in this field. 
Given the political limitations, Eurocontrol is not 
aiming at the full marketization of the ATM system 
but rather at the creation and opening of the market 
for some Air Navigation Services (ANS) support 
services. Nevertheless the debate also addressed 
more general issues concerning the role of markets 
and competition in ATM.
An important element of the discussion was the EU 
vs. US comparison. The US is an important point of 
reference for Eurocontrol to call for further reforms 
of ATM in Europe: ATM costs in Europe are still 
50% higher than in the US, in spite of comparable 
conditions; average flight lengths, airspace size are 
equivalent, while some allowances must be made 
for different geography and levels of traffic handled. 
Regular Eurocontrol/FAA comparisons, however, 
suggest that gains could be made through a more 
consolidated European system. On the other hand, a 
“United States of Europe” is no realistic scenario for 
the near future and Member States will continue to 
play an important role. Still, all stakeholders present 
at the Forum acknowledged that the fragmentation 
of ATM in Europe was the main cause for its 
comparatively weak performance. In the context 
of the EU-US comparison important differences 
between the two continents were mentioned as well. 
Outsourcing in the US, for example, had already 
begun in the early 1980s, and today elements 
of ATM services such as flight service stations, 
automatic dependent surveillance broadcasting, air 
traffic controller training and data communication 
services are provided by privates. 
Summary of the discussions at the 5th 
Florence Air Forum
NADIA BERT | FSR-Transport; DAVID KUPFER | FSR-Transport
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But it is also clear that “markets” and competition 
are clearly underdeveloped in the ATM world, at 
global as well as at national levels. Globally two 
ATM system providers compete in international 
tenders for infrastructure deployment with the 
exception of Canada and Japan, where ANSPs 
provide their own infrastructure. In the US there 
is even less competition than in Europe as two US 
companies specializing in different fields of ATM 
dominate the market for infrastructure deployment. 
It was pointed out that markets are most effective in 
enhancing efficiency when there are new entrants or 
new types of services are being provided, as was the 
case in the airline liberalization. Replacing existing 
national monopolies with a similar, reconfigured 
European wide monopoly would not increase 
efficiency; essentially there should be at least three 
competitors in any market to generate competitive 
conditions.
Nevertheless, “competition for the market” where 
consortia, made up of, for example, national ANSPs 
and private solution partners, compete for licences 
in European-wide tenderings for the CS can have an 
integrating effect by bringing ANSPs closer to the 
idea of establishing joint ventures and participating 
in cross-border projects. It is also reaching out to 
Eurocontrol members that are not EU-members. 
They get a chance to provide a service in the EU, 
and they can become closely involved in the 
development of new services at an early stage. 
Extending beyond the debate about the system 
of service provision and the role of markets, the 
discussion revealed the important role of the 
industry and the integrating function technological 
developments can have. Industry-led initiatives such 
as COOPANS, for example, led to close cooperation 
of ANSPs from five countries with them sharing 
investments and establishing common procurement, 
joint activities and managerial approaches. SESAR, 
has been a valuable tool for defining and validating 
new technological approaches, but was criticized 
for not making provisions for implementation. It 
was stressed that common rules and requirements 
have to be defined when moving forward with 
the market approach so as not to lose sight of the 
central goal of interoperability. The discussion 
revealed that there was some strong opposition to 
the concept of unbundling of ATM services. There 
are some perils connected to unbundling, as it may 
lead to a new fragmentation if there was no clear 
regulation of the system with strong requirements 
for interoperability.
On the other hand it was also questioned whether 
the term unbundling would be appropriate for the 
reform ideas under discussion.
Furthermore, the risk of creating monopoly 
situations with the CS causes some concern also on 
the side of the industry. 
What roles and responsibilities for the key 
actors in an emerging ATC market?
The architecture of the SES is a crucial element 
that has to be addressed when moving forward 
with market elements in ATC support services. 
Indeed the institutional structure of the SES is 
currently relatively complex. The diversity of 
actors involved has been addressed, and it was 
pointed out that the ever growing complexity that 
resulted from the creation of new institutions was 
starting to slow down the reform process, instead 
of pushing it forwards. Looking at the ideas for 
reform from an actor’s perspective and discussing 
future roles and responsibilities of key actors such 
as the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), 
Eurocontrol, Member States’ ANSPs, airlines and 
ATM system providers was an important element 
of the discussion.
The ATM Industry
In the discussion over a vision for the future 
of the European ATM system there was strong 
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support for a more industry-centred approach. 
The European Commission should retain its 
regulatory competence while the rulemaking 
should be guided by industry consultation through 
bodies such as the Industry Consultation Body 
(ICB). Different stakeholders also called for a 
more practice-oriented R&D management, and 
for SESAR to supply solutions that are more in line 
with the vision of the industry and oriented towards 
deployment. An important role would have to be 
played by the deployment manager as the main 
operational stakeholder. It should be empowered by 
the Commission to build and maintain consensus 
on how new services should be deployed and 
provided. The main concern of the industry is that 
especially R&D activities are directed towards their 
needs. In order for investments in technological 
research to be fully useful they need to become 
more deployment-oriented, something which can 
be achieved only by closely involving manufactures 
as well as the airlines.
Airlines
Because of being “the ones paying the bills” through 
route charges, airlines strongly called for becoming 
more closely involved. Airlines clearly see the ANSPs 
as bottlenecks when it comes to efficiency and 
underlined three reasons why from their perspective 
ANSPs need to move on more quickly with reforms: 
firstly, airlines themselves, have undergone a 
Liabilities in the Single European Sky1
DELPHINE DEFOSSEZ, GIOVANNI SARTOR, HANNA SCHEBESTA | European 
University Institute
One of the major challenges in delivering the Single European Sky (SES) is the fragmentation of Air Traffic 
Control (ATC) services. Market opening is seen as a way to achieve a less fragmented service provision, and 
in this vein SES 2+ foresees an enhanced role for Centralised Services (CS).
The Eurocontrol’s CS initiative identified 10 air navigation services, to be provided on behalf of Eurocontrol 
at pan-European level by Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSP) under performance-driven contracts. 
Although the CS initiative concerns important services, around 30% of the examined SESAR projects (90 
projects) are expected to be implemented not at pan-European, but at FAB (Functional Airspace Block) 
level. The FAB level therefore maintains its projected important role in complementing CS in achieving 
performance goals and in defragmenting service provision.
Within FABs, governance is one of the major challenges, including sovereignty and liability which still pose 
a difficulty in the context of cross-border ATC service provision. Eurocontrol states that a “number of FABs 
reported liability and sovereignty as real challenges to the introduction of the FAB”2. 
The European Commission Guidance Material for the Establishment and Modification of FAB stressed the 
role of the FAB agreements as a means to mitigate the risks and allocate liabilities. However, provisions 
regarding liability, including insurance aspects and dispute resolution, are optional.  
At the constitutive level of FABs, a comparison shows that the FAB State level agreements address liability in 
divergent manners, if at all. Some make no mention of liability (UK-Ireland, FAB CE, Danube, Denmark-
1. ALIAS (Addressing the Liability Impact of Automated Systems) project, co-financed by EUROCONTROL acting on behalf of the 
SESAR JU with funds from the EU as part of Work-Package E. For more information about innovation and liability in aviation visit 
www.aliasnetwork.eu.
2. Eurocontrol Performance Review Commission, Evaluation of FAB initiatives and their contribution to performance improvement 
(October 2008), 9.
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liberalization process that has made them more 
efficient, whereas ANSPs, the “upstream market” 
in the aviation value chain, remain monopolistic 
and state-controlled. Secondly, given their current 
economic situation, airlines, especially traditional 
network carriers, urgently need to cut their costs 
in order to remain competitive. Thirdly, airlines 
have already invested a lot into the modernisation 
of their fleets, which would however be useless 
if ground services are not mode compatible. 
During the Forum it was also made clear how 
airlines seek to have more say in achieving cost 
reductions in ATM. For instance, the A4 initiative 
is a cooperation of four airlines aimed at increasing 
the role of operators and supporting the process 
of SESAR deployment in a way that it produces 
maximum benefits in terms of cost reductions. 
ANSPs and EU Member States
Existing ANSPs have an important stake in the 
future. They need to consolidate the preferences of 
Eurocontrol Member States for maintaining national 
ATM service providers with incentives to enhance 
their performance during the transition to a Single 
European Sky. ANSPs face a difficult situation and 
feel that this is not sufficiently acknowledged by the 
other stakeholders. From the ANSPs’ perspective, a 
lot has already been achieved in terms of efficiency 
as seen in the regular reports of the Performance 
Review Body. Furthermore, Member States 
Sweden), thereby falling back on the general international law and State responsibility doctrines. Those 
agreements which explicitly address liability allocate primary liability to the State of damage occurrence. 
A notable exception is the NEFAB agreement, which, next to State liability, also provides for liability of 
the ANSP (although direct claims against staff or agents are excluded). However, in some FAB agreements 
strong rights of recourse against the effective ANSPs are foreseen for damages resulting from the fault of the 
latter. Further, the Baltic FAB and FABEC agreements require adequate liability coverage for effective Air 
Traffic Service (ATS) providers. 
Generally, FABs agreements addressing liability confirm the primary liability of the territorial State, while 
the effective service providers are liable only by means of recourse. NEFAB further provides a right of 
recourse to ANSPs to recover incurred costs proportionate to a Contracting State’s contribution to that loss 
or damage. The Baltic FAB agreement is interesting as it enables liability sharing by expressly stipulating that 
the agreement shall not prevent the State of damage occurrence and the Contracting Party of the effective 
ATS provider from agreeing to share costs resulting from damage. 
It is true that liability issues can be addressed at contractual level. However, such negotiations can prove 
difficult and can significantly protract the successful conclusion of a service agreement. Moreover, the 
individual outcomes of contract negotiations in terms of resulting liabilities are often the result of pragmatic 
pressure to reach an agreement. Risks accepted for example by ANSPs may be excessive, and insurance 
coverage may be insufficient.  
Where service provision is envisaged at FAB level, an ‘unbundling’ of core and supporting services may 
require a further rethinking of the design of liability regimes. In line with a market oriented provision 
of services it may be also time to reconsider a market oriented allocation of liability, breaking with the 
territorial State liability doctrine. 
From a functional perspective, liability not only ensures the compensation of victims. It is also a form of risk 
regulation and management, which couples tasks and liabilities and thereby provides incentives to market 
participants.  
Liabilities indeed could contribute to increase the likelihood of compliance through sanctions and induce 
risk mitigating behaviour by placing liability (also) with ancillary service providers. In addition, liability 
itself can become an issue on which service providers compete when bidding for contracts. 
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have shown the political will to compromise on 
sovereignty over the national airspace so as to 
achieve greater system efficiency in the European 
skies. Smaller ANSPs perceive themselves as being 
pushed to the sides with larger ANSPs exerting 
too much influence, especially when it comes to 
defining performance targets and research projects 
within the SESAR program. 
From the Member States’ perspective the creation of 
markets for ATC has been criticized as a “leap into 
the unknown” because of the many issues that need 
clarification. There are, for example, questions of 
who has liability under the new provision structure, 
how would investments be maintained in a private 
environment, and what would be the links with the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).
Yet, it was also stated that the involvement of ANSPs 
in consortia to participate in tendering procedure 
for the CS can trigger a learning effect towards a 
more integrated system; ANSPs may discover the 
benefits of outsourcing one support service and 
of acting as a supplier of another service for other 
ANSPs.
EASA
If Eurocontrol pursues a role in service provision 
it would require safety oversight by EASA. It was 
questioned whether Eurocontrol as a supra-EU 
organisation could be under the oversight of 
EASA, an EU organization. At this time, there are 
Eurocontrol members that are not EU Members 
and have not bilaterally agreed on accepting EASA 
oversight.
Charging for Air Traffic Control Services
KENNETH BUTTON | George Mason University
Air Navigation Services (ANS) are an important element in the provision of all forms of air transportation, 
ranging from the military, through the civil/commercial, to the private flier. There are rules that govern 
safe flight, and Air Traffic Control (ATC) enforces these, while other functions of Air Navigation Services 
Providers (ANSP) help those flying to plan their flights and to appreciate the challenges of changing weather 
patterns. 
As with any other services, those provided by ANSPs require investment, financing, and planning. These 
needs can be met in a number of ways; the most traditional in the ASNP context seeing ANSs being treated 
as a public service with the government providing investment, managing the undertakings, and being 
involved in a significant part the design of systems. In part, this has been an historical legacy with much of 
the structure and technology of ATC, in particular, being linked to military needs. It was also an approach 
that, until the 1980s was consistent with other elements in the air transport supply chain, and especially 
airlines and airports, which were also largely publicly owned and regulated, and were often in receipt of 
public subsidies.
The world has changed, there has been a trend in all elements of the aviation sector to seek to move away 
from heavy-handed government planning, and to allow market forces more sway in the way it functions; 
we have seen airlines privatized and their markets opened to competition, and airports being corporatized 
or privatized. In the context of ANSPs, this has resulted in more private sector participation through such 
things as public/private partnerships as with UK NATS, and greater outsources, as begun by the US Federal 
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The Military
Any reforms in the ATM system have to be closely 
coordinated with the Military. Indeed, the civil and 
military ATM are closely linked and taking correctly 
account of military needs from an early stage is 
crucial so as not to put the success of a reform at risk 
because of an incompatibility with military needs. 
The matter of military airspace was only briefly 
touched upon in discussions, in the context of 
integrating the military and civil ATM systems. The 
challenges here are that Eurocontrol Member States 
have different arrangements with their Military, and 
with super-national entities such as NATO, that 
are often difficult to discuss for security reasons. 
However, the Military was absent at the current 
Forum and will have to be included into the debate 
at a future stage.
Markets or Monopolies?
An important element of the discussion in this panel 
from an academic standpoint was the question to 
what extent the different elements of the ATM value 
chain were natural monopolies or not. Because of 
this, markets may not always be useful. Indeed, while 
certain components like radar systems are natural 
monopolies others are not. Furthermore a natural 
monopoly does not mean that the monopoly is 
everlasting, as technological developments change 
the characteristics of the system and can create new 
space for competition.
Aviation Authority. Administratively, there has been the widespread adoption of corporatization, with 
ASNPs, while in many cases still public entities, ceasing to be a direct arm of the government and permitted 
to seek funding from private sources. 
While there is clearly fine-tuning to be completed regarding these structural issues, the matter of pricing 
users for their use of ANS has been given somewhat less attention. The underpinning of much of what is 
still done, and for example that of Eurocontrol’s new charging regime, can be traced back to concepts laid 
out at the 1944 Chicago Convention; namely that pricing should be non-discriminatory and cost based. 
The laudable objective being of this approach being that countries should not be allowed to favor their own 
carriers, and that ensuring cost recovery would help facilitate this. 
The trouble is that such an approach misses some of the very raison d’être for pricing. Optimal pricing 
basically allocates the services that are available efficiently according to the value users derive from them, 
indicates when prices rise above costs, that more investment may be justified, and generates a flow of 
revenue to finance the system. Simple cost recover only relates to the third of these; it de facto is purely 
supply driven, and contains no consideration of the demand side for ANSs. Additionally, the advent of Open 
Skies in many of the world’s international airline markets together with the widespread use of hub-and-
spoke networks in various forms, has considerably reduced the ability to discriminate in the ways feared in 
1944.
Of course, there is no such thing as a perfect price system, and ANSs certainly have features such as 
interactions between systems, the indiscrete natures of the hard and software used, and the multifaceted 
nature of the services offered, that hardly match the ideal, basic price model. The issue is rather whether, 
the ANS system, and its users, would be better served by moving away from what may loosely be termed 
engineering driven charging regimes, with a focus primarily on the technology used, as for example the 
NextGen initiative in the US and the Single European Sky in Europe, to one that pays more attention to 
improving the efficiency of the use of the system and provides automatic indicators as to where changes are 
needed. Without the types of insights that economic prices provide it is difficult to have efficient decisions 
regarding optimal provision and use of any ANS; appropriate pricing is pre-requisite of efficiency and not 
some after thought.
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Market regulator, network manager, 
etc.: how will and how should the role of 
Eurocontrol evolve in the future?
Eurocontrol takes over different functions in the 
SES and has recently started itself a discussion 
about its future roles. In the discussion reference 
was made to the publicly available twelve vision 
points that formulate several ideas forward. Also, 
Member States have agreed to launch a study group 
to discuss the contentious issue of Eurocontrol’s 
legal framework, something they have long 
refrained from doing. During the discussion, 
many of the positive contributions of Eurocontrol 
were pointed out by different stakeholders. The 
unique experience, know-how and wide scope of 
technical expertise was acknowledged, as well as 
its impartiality as an international organisation, 
which for some would make it the ideal candidate 
for market oversight. Another strong point noted 
was Eurocontrol’s unique integration with military 
requirements; Eurocontrol has been closely working 
with NATO, which is an important asset in this 
regard. Furthermore it has technical expertise and 
operational experience, including that entailed in 
running the Maastricht Upper Area Control Centre.
Several present and possible future roles of 
Eurocontrol were discussed during the Forum such 
as market controller, European ANSP, network 
manager, service provider, European Aviation 
Agency. 
Network manager or market regulator?
From Eurocontrol’s perspective it would make 
sense to link the CS and the network manager and 
then further enable EASA in its oversight function: 
EASA already oversees the network manager and it 
could do so also for the CS. This would also be a first 
step towards a new system, as EASA could build up 
competence in this new field and further establish 
EASA as the ATM regulator.
The discussion on the future of Eurocontrol also 
saw different opinions in regards to the role of 
markets and to the idea of Eurocontrol as a “market 
regulator”. Some stressed the fact that ATM was a 
monopoly that was born out of safety considerations 
to provide for a system in which ATM services are 
provided on an exclusive basis. When it comes to 
ATC support services, competition is possible, but 
only on the level of procurement decisions at the 
national, ANSP-level and therefore outside the 
sphere of competence of Eurocontrol. Network 
management is the administration of a public 
service rather than the regulation of a commercial 
market. From this perspective, a decision has to be 
made whether the network manager should be an 
integrated or a bundled monopoly or whether its 
different functions and services should be provided 
by a variety of entities. The next question would 
then be which functions and services are best 
provided at which geographical level and under 
what governance structure.
Service Provider
There was little disagreement that Eurocontrol 
should not further extend its role as a service 
provider itself. Such a step would put it into direct 
competition with other ANSPs. The initial proposal 
by the European Commission to set up Eurocontrol 
as an independent service provider in the form of 
an industrial partnership, which was taken back by 
the European Parliament, would have led to a cartel, 
rather than to a market. It was however underlined 
that, because of its vast expertise, Eurocontrol 
should play a role in the CS.
In the discussion the CS were identified as pointing 
towards the possible future role of Eurocontrol. 
There would be a stronger industry orientation 
with the network manager clearly at the core and a 
strong role for the industry although bound by and 
under the oversight of the EU governance structure. 
The functions of deployment manager and network 
manager would converge over time.
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Towards a European Aviation Agency?
Other roles that could be envisaged were also 
discussed: Eurocontrol could join together with 
EASA and become a true European Aviation 
Agency. If it was to become in charge of market 
oversight in ATM services, it would also have an 
important industry dimension; it was pointed out 
that the European ATM Industry is likely to soon 
face competition from emerging economies, and 
thus there is the need to set standards and licences 
in a coherent way to promote the development of 
the European ATM industry. 
While it is clear that Eurocontrol wants to stay out 
of “regulation”, it can and will have to play a role in 
standardisation and licencing, two fields in which 
Eurocontrol had always played an active role.
12 ■  FSR Transport ■ Issue 2014/02 ■ April 2014
Eurocontrol, The Eurocontrol History Book
Written by John McInally, former Eurocontrol official, this History Book 
is a description of the key institutional, legal and organisational events 
and decisions that have determined the progress of the Eurocontrol 
Organisation and its Agency through the past fifty years.
The Book is a record, in one document, of the circumstances surrounding 
these events and the nature of the performance of Eurocontrol against 
what was required of it.
***
Button, Kenneth and Neiva, Rui, Economic Efficiency of European Air 
Traffic Control Systems, Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, 
Volume 48, Part 1, January 2014, pp. 65–80 
This paper is concerned with variations in the efficiency of European 
air navigation service providers. Much analysis has been conducted on 
the efficiency of airlines, but less has been done on air traffic control, or 
strictly air navigation services. The diversity of air navigation service 
providers in Europe allows comparison of thirty-six European systems 
from 2002 to 2009. The bootstrapped data envelopment analysis 
framework adopted assumes a multifaceted output function with both 
physical and policy inputs. Attention is paid to the relative efficiencies of 
different types of air navigation service providers and the implications 
of financial structures.
***
Performance Review Commission, ATM Cost-Effectiveness (ACE) 2011 
Benchmarking Report with 2012-2016 outlook
This report is the eleventh in a series of annual reports based on 
mandatory information disclosure provided by 37 Air Navigation 
Services Providers (ANSPs) to the EUROCONTROL Performance 
Review Commission (PRC). This report comprises factual data and 
analysis on cost-effectiveness and productivity for 37 ANSPs for the year 
2011, including high level trend analysis for the years 2007-2011. The 
scope of the report is both en-route and terminal navigation services 
(i.e. gate-to-gate). The main focus is on the ATM/CNS provision costs as 
these costs are under the direct control and responsibility of the ANSP. 
Further Readings
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Costs borne by airspace users for less than optimal quality of service 
are also considered. The report describes a performance framework 
for the analysis of cost-effectiveness. The framework highlights 3 key 
performance drivers contributing to cost-effectiveness (productivity, 
employment costs and support costs). The report also presents detailed 
productivity comparisons for 63 Area Control Centres (ACCs) grouped 
in 3 clusters of different traffic complexity characteristics. Finally, the 
report analyses forward looking information for the years 2012-2016, 
inferring on future financial cost-effectiveness performance at both 
system and ANSP levels, and displaying future capital expenditures and 
future capacity plans.
***
Eurocontrol/FAA, Comparison of Air Traffic Management-Related 2012 
Operational Performance: U.S./Europe
This document is a joint publication of the Air Traffic Organisation 
System Operations Services of the FAA and the Performance Review 
Commission of EUROCONTROL in the interest of the exchange of 
information.
The objective was to make a factual high-level comparison of Air Traffic 
Management performance between the US and Europe. The initial 
focus was to develop a set of comparable performance measures in 
order to create a sound basis for factual high-level comparisons between 
countries and world regions. The specific key performance indicators 
(KPIs) are based on best practices from both the Air Traffic Organisation 
System Operations Services and the Performance Review Commission.
***
Grebenšek, A. and Magister T. (2013) Is European benchmarking 
methodology favouring a narrow segment of air navigation service 
providers? Journal of Air Transport Management, 27, 29-33
This paper looks at the calculation of composite flight hours used input 
to performance benchmarking of European air navigation service 
providers. The way the en-route part of the composite flight hours is 
obtained, potentially rewards busy air navigation service providers 
serving larger airports with additional composite flight hours, thus 
making them more productive and financially cost-efficient. It also 
examines the financial effect of the methodology and links it to economic 
cost-effectiveness.
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